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IN THE SUPREME COURT 








BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter arises out of an action for divorce in-
volving events arising subsequent to the rendition of the 
Decree of Divorce, whereby plaintiff was granted a De-
cree of Divorce from defendant, and defendant was 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from plaintiff on her 
counterclaim. 
1 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order hold-
ing the appellant in contempt of court for failure to 
comply with the Decree of Divorce, and further re-
straining plaintiff from maintaining a separate cause of 
action against defendant for adjudication or personal 
property rights in and to certain personal property that 
plaintiff claims defendant removed from his dwelling 
house. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's 
order dated May 2, 1968, on the grounds that the court, 
in holding the plaintiff in contempt thereof, violated 
plaintiff's constitutional rights, and the court in its en-
tering a restraining order restraining plaintiff from 
pursuing his cause of action against defendant did so 
contrary to law. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in July of 
1966; and at the time of the rendition of the Decree of 
Divorce, the defendant was awarded in lieu of alimony 
the sum of $2,400.00 payable at the rate of $200.00 per 
month for one year without interest. (R-28) 
In addition thereto, defendant was awarded certain 
items of personal property, which by a further memoran· 
dum decision rendered by the Court on September 23, 
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1966, additional personal property was given to the 
defendant. ( R-32, 33) 
Thereafter, the defendant removed herself from 
the dwelling house that had been awarded to the plain-
tiff, but according to the allegations of plaintiff re-
moved personal property not awarded to her, having a 
value in exce.ss of $2,000.00. (R-99) 
The plaintiff, by reason of defendant's conduct, re-
fused to pay the balance of the $2,400.00 called for in 
the original Decree of Divorce, claiming an offset for 
the property removed by defendant. (R-99, 100) Sub-
sequently, the defendant caused an order to show cause 
to be issued ordering the plaintiff to appear and show 
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court 
for his failure to pay the judgment. This matter was 
the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, 
Case No. 10992, the decision of the Supreme Court being 
rendered on February 19, 1968. (R-73) 
At the time of the hearing on the order to show 
cause, the court went into matters not plead pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but did adjudicate the 
property rights of the plaintiff in and to certain personal 
property which he claimed defendant had removed from 
the dwelling house. In addition thereto, the court held 
that the plaintiff was in contempt of court and ordered 
him to serve five days in the County Jail. 
The court, in its decision, held that even though 
there was only three days notice to the plaintiff, and 
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even though there had been no written pleadings filed, 
the matter with regard to the adjudication of the pro-
perty rights was properly before the court; but the court 
did rule that because no affidavit had been filed with 
regards to the alleged contempt, the court had impro-
perly held the plaintiff to be in contempt of court. 
Following the rendition of the Supreme Court's 
decision, the defendant filed an affidavit in compliance 
with the Utah statute, and proceeded to a new adjudi-
cation as to whether or not the plaintiff was in contempt 
of court. The court found that he was, and ordered him 
to serve fifteen days in the County Jail. (R-120) 
In addition thereto, the court entered a restraining 
order restraining plaintiff from continuing an inde-
pendent action filed by plaintiff against the defendant 
to adjudicate property rights in certain personal prop-
erty that plaintiff claims defendant has. The property 





RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED IN HOLDING 
HIM IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR HIS 
FAILURE TO PAY A MONEY JUDGMENT. 
Under the original Decree of Divorce, the appel· 
lant wa.s ordered to pay to the respondent a money 
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judgment of $2,400.00. (R-28) The appellant's re-
fusal to pay this money judgment may not be punished 
by contempt of court in that the Constitution of Utah 
specifically holds that there shall be no imprisonment 
for debt. Article I, Section 16, Constitution of Utah. 
Imprisonment for debt, while popular in the early 
colonial days of our country, fell into disuse hundreds 
of years ago, and the various states of the Union, in 
enacting their constitutions, expressly prohibited im-
prisonment for debt. In speaking of the subject, 16 
Am J ur 2nd, 723, Constitutional Law, Section 386, 
observed: 
"In a few other states, the constitution forbids 
imprisonment for debt, except in cases of ab-
sconding debtors. Such a prohibition is broad 
and sweeping, and no limitations should be read 
into it except that exception which actually exists, 
inserted by the makers of the constitution them-
selves in accordance with their expre~sed inten-
tion." (citing cases) 
The provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec-
tion 16, reads: 
"There shall be no imprisonment for debt ex-
cept in cases of absconding debtors." 
It is obvious from the reading of the Utah Constitu-
tion, and from the observations made by the authors of 
American Jurisprudence, that the only limitation that 
the framers of the Utah Constitution saw fit to place 
therein was for absconding debtors. 
5 
It is recognized by the appellant that courts may 
enforce their decrees with regards to the payment of 
"alimony" and "support money," by contempt of court 
proceedings. With this plaintiff makes no quarrel, and 
in fact recognizes that the great weight of authority 
holds this to be the law. However, under the facts of 
the instant case, the trial court at the time of the rendi· 
tion of the decree specifically stated that the $2,400.00 
due to the respondent was "in lieu of alimony," and 
therefore constituted nothing more than a money judg· 
ment. As this is in fact a money judgment, the court 
may not enforce under the guise of enforcing the pay· 
ment of alimony, an order compelling the payment of 
this money judgment. To do so flies in the teeth of 
the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. 
If this were the case, any money judgment rendered by 
a court could be followed by an order of court directing 
the judgment debtor to pay the judgment upon punish· 
ment of contempt proceedings if he failed so to do. This 
would in effect be imprisonment for debt if the debtor 
did not pay the money judgment. 
The law has provided the remedies of a judgment 
creditor to collect a money judgment. 
There is nothing to prevent the respondent in this 
matter from pursuing her statutory rights to collect by 
execution and garnishment. But to allow the court, 
through the medium of contempt proceedings on the 
theory that this is a domestic relations affair, to hold 
the plaintiff in contempt of court and punishing him by 
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placing him in jail is to go contrary to the constitutional 
guarantees afforded the appellant. 
Had the trial court wished to denominate this 
$2,400.00 as "alimony," it could have done so not only 
on the occasion of rendering the original Decree of Di-
vorce, but at the time it rendered it~ subsequent modifi-
cations of that decree, and so far as that goes at the 
time that it in effect modified the Decree of Divorce at 
the time of the hearing in June of 1967, which gave 
rise to the first appeal of this matter. 
Alimony means money for the support of a divorced 
wife. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 U. 300, 172 P.2d 132. 
"\Vhen the court stated that the $2,400.00 was in "lieu of 
mimony ," it left nothing to conjecture that the $2,400.00 
was for the wife's support. 
A similar case as the one before the Court now 
arose in California in the matter of Bradley v. Superior 
Court (Supreme Court of California, 1957) 310 P.2d 
634. In this case the parties had entered into a property 
settlement agreement which was incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce. This called for periodic payments 
by the husband to the wife of certain income which he 
derived from mining properties. He ref used to pay part 
of these payments, and was held in contempt of court 
and sentenced to jail. The husband asserted the provi-
sions of the California Constitution, Article I, Section 
14, which states: 
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt in 
any civil action, on mense or final process, unless 
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in cases of fraud, nor in civil actions for torts 
except in cases for willful injury to. person 0; 
property; and no person shall be imprisoned for 
a militia fine in time of peace." 
The California court held that this provision of tge Con-
stitution barred the imprisonment of the husband for 
the nonpayment to the wife of this money on the theory 
that the moneys due were not alimony or support money, 
but was part of a property settlement and therefore 
only enforceable as any normal money judgment. The 
court reflected and said: 
"Although 'as in the case of all constitutional 
provisions designed to safeguard the liberties of 
the person, every doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the liberty of the citizen in the enforce-
ment of the constitutional provision that no per· 
son shall be imprisoned for debt.' (Citing Au-
thority) A court may nevertheless punish by 
imprisonment as a contempt the willful act of a 
spouse (or former spouse) who, having the abili-
ty and opportunity to comply, deliberately re· 
fuses to pay a valid order to pay alimony or an 
allowance for the support of the other spouse (or 
former other spouse). It is held that the obliga· 
tion to make such payments is not a 'debt' within 
the meaning of the constitutional guarante~ 
against imprisonment for debt. (Citing Cases) 
"Where, however, the payments provided in 
the property settlement agreement constitute a~ 
adjustment of property interests, rather than ah· 
mony, support or maintenance, the more gen· 
erally prevailing rule is stated to be that decrees 
based thereon are not enforceable by contempt 
proceedings." 
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The court, in summarizing its position, stated: 
"Inasmuch as it has been finally determined as 
between the parties that the payments to be made 
by petitioner to Francis in the present case con-
~titute 'an inseverable part of an integrated ad-
justment of all property relations of the parties 
and not * * * a severable portion for alimony' 
(citing cases) we conclude that enforcement of 
such payments by contempt proceedings is for-
bidden by the constitutional prohibition against 
imprisonment for debt." 
Arizona had a like situation arise in the case of Stone 
v. Stidham, Judge (1964) 96 Ariz 235, 393 P.2d 923, 
wherein the Supreme Court of Arizona, in holding that 
a writ of prohibition would lie against the Superior 
Court to enforce a Decree of Divorce by contempt pro-
ceedings, stated: 
"As in all cases of constitutional provisions, 
designed to safeguard the liberty of the person, 
every reasonable doubt should be resolved in 
favor of such liberty." 
"The term alimony does not contemplate a 
settlement of property interest or general endow-
ment of wealth. Like the alimentum in civil law 
from which the word was derived, it has for its 
sole object the provision of food, clothing, habita-
tion and other necessities for support. We be-
lieve the better view is that the decree incorporat-
ing property settlement agreement cannot be 
enforced by contempt proceedings." 
This court further pointed out that the question of whe-
ther "alimony" or a "property settlement" was involved 
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would not be determined by the Supreme Court, but 
would be determined by the trial court or the court 
of first instance. We submit that in the case now be-
fore this court the determination as to whether or not 
this was in fact "alimony" or a "property settlement" 
was decided by the court when it denominated the 
moneys due to the defendant as moneys "in lieu of ali-
mony," consequently this question has been laid to rest 
by the trial court in the original Decree of Divorce. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD INSUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO 
BASE A CONTEMPT OF COURT FINDING. 
The appellant in this matter testified at the time 
of the second hearing, and for that matter at the time 
of the first hearing on the contempt of court citation, 
that the reason he had not paid his wife was that she 
had removed personal property belonging to him from 
the family home, and ref used to return it, and that he 
was claiming an offset against the moneys he was 
ordered to pay her "in lieu of alimony." (R-98, 99, 100). 
Mr. Bott stated when he was asked: 
"Why did you stop paying her." 
ANSWER: "Because when she moved I 
stayed home from work one time. I wanted to 
see she got out of the house. She didn't p~ck 
anything when I was there. I told her, knowin~ 
her as I did, I said 'Anything you take that dont 
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belong to you I will have to charge it back to you.' 
An.d that ~s what she did .. It took me quite a 
w.hil~ to fmd out ever~thmg. That is why I 
d1dn t pay her anything. 
QUESTION: "You stopped paying because 
you found out some of your things were missing?" 
ANSWER: "Yes." 
QUESTION: "And you told her you would 
charge her up for anything she took that be-
longed to you t' 
ANSWER: "Right" (R-98, 99, 100) 
It is respectfully submitted that an off set is justi-
fication for nonpayment, and that therefore appellant 
did not stand in contempt of the court's order. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. 
The appellant in this matter was put on trial by 
the District Court in June of 1967, for contempt of 
court. This contempt of court conviction was overturned 
by the Supreme Court of Utah in February of 1968. 
Subsequently the appellant was tried a second time for 
the same alleged contempt of court, the contempt of 
court allegations covering the same period of time as 
was adjudicated in the prior action. It is respectfully 
submitted that pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah, the appellant may not be put 
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twice in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Whit-
man, 93 U. 557, 74 P.2d 696; State v. Sandman~ 4 U.2d 
69, 286 P.2d 1060. 
It will be argued to the court that the holding of 
the Supreme Court in February of 1968 was to rule 
that the court had no jurisdiction and therefore double 
jeopardy will not attach. State v. Empey, 65 U. 609, 
239 P. 25. It is respectfully submitted, however, that 
if the court had no j~risdiction as to the contempt of 
court charge, it also had no jurisdiction to proceed for-
ward with the other matter~ which were incident to and 
based upon the motion for contempt citation which 
brought the parties before the court in the first instance. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the court's ruling in 
February of 1968 must stand for the proposition that 
the court did have jurisdiction over the parties, and that 
the Supreme Court's holding that the contempt of court 
could not stand now invokes the doctrine of double 
jeopardy. 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court is faced 
with a paradoxical situation of either the court had 
jurisdiction over the partie~ in the first instance in June 
of 1967, for all purposes or it did not have jurisdiction 
over the parties for any purpose, and as it ruled pre· 
viously that it did in fact have jurisdiction for the pur· 
poses of settling and trying issues of property, then it 
must have had jurisdiction over the person of the appel· 
lant, although for procedural reasons the trial court's 
judgment as to contempt of court was in error. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL C 0 UR T COMMITTED 
ERROR IN ENTERING AN INJUNCTIVE 
ORDER AGAINST APPELLANT FROM PRO-
SECUTING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST 
RESPONDENT. 
The appellant instituted an action against respond-
ent on March 27, 1968, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, entitled Celeste Bott v. 
Mary Turner Bott, Civil No. 178623, said action being 
for the recovery of a money judgment for the wrongful 
conversion of personal property. The District Court, 
without having examined the file, but taking judicial 
notice of it, made a determination over the objection of 
appellant that the matter therein contained had been 
adjudicated in the matter presented to the Supreme 
Court heretofore. It was pointed out to the court at 
that time that this was not the fact, and that at the pre-
vious hearing in June of 1967, all of the property which 
respondent had taken from the appellant's dwelling 
house had not been adjudicated and that this law suit 
sought to do just that. 
The Constitution of Utah has guaranteed to the 
appellant his right to the courts of this State, and the 
right to prosecute an action before the courts of this 
State. 
Article I, Section 11, provides: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for any injury done to him in his person, property 
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or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party." 
It is respectfully submitted that if in fact this ac· 
tion filed by the appellant against respondent was barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata, this would constitute an 
affirmative defense which must be raised before the court 
having jurisdiction over that matter by the filing of a 
proper motion in that case. Rule 8 ( c) , Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, states: 
"Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a pre· 
ceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirma· 
tively ***res judicata ***and arw other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court ex· 
ceeded its jurisdiction in entering the injunctive order 
in the divorce action against the appellant from contin· 
uing further proceedings in his independent action filed 
in Di~trict Court. It is submitted that the proper pro· 
cedure should have been the filing of a motion to dismiss 
based upon res judicata in the independent action, and 
upon examination of the facts, the opportunity to file 
affidavits and other evidence, the court could then have 
determined whether or not the defense of res judicata 
in that action was applicable. 
The method employed by the District Court in en· 
joining the appellant from proceeding forward with 
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his independent action is contrary to Article I, Section 
11, of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SEN-
TENCING APPELLANT TO A GREATER 
TERM IN JAIL THAN THAT ORIGINALLY 
ORDERED. 
The appellant in June of 1967 was ordered com-
mitted to the County Jail for a period of five days. This 
order was overturned by the Supreme Court. The trial 
court, in hearing the same ca!)e on the same merits, with 
the same evidence covering the same period of time, 
increased the punishment of appellant three fold by 
ordering him to be committed for a period of fifteen 
days. 
It is submitted that to increase the punishment of 
appellant is to in effect deprive him of equal protec-
tions of the laws and of due process of law under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States, as well as to the constitutional 
guarantees under the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
It is submitted that the law should be that an 
~ 
accused should not be punished for his willingness to 
challenge by an appeal to a higher court a lower court's 
ruling, and if it is found that the lower court lacked 
jurisdiction over the appellant in the first instance then 
the appellant should not be punished by a greater im-
position of fine or imprisonment upon a second trial. 
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It is admitted by appellant that he can cite no 
general law to the court that this is the law. But it 
should be the law. To the contrary, it is admitted that 
it has been held that where a person has been charged 
with a crime, found guilty, and sentt:nced to imprison. 
ment, and subsequently it is found that the court lacked 
jurisdiction, that that person may be tried again for 
that offense and greater or le~ser punishment may be 
meted out, the theory being that if the court had no 
jurisdiction anything that it did was void and therefore 
the accused had no been injured or harmed in any way, 
even though by reason of his availing himself of his 
constitutional guarantees to a fair trial by appealing 
to a higher court he runs the risk of greater punishment. 
It is submitted that to allow the court to inflict 
greater punishment upon one who had exercised his 
constitutional guarantee~ is to in effect "chill the asser· 
tion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who 
chose to exercise them." United States v. Jackson 
{1968) ______ U.S ....... , 20 L.ed 2d 138, 88 S.Ct ....... .. 
In this case, which arose under the constitutionality of 
the Lindbergh kidnap law and the imposing of the death 
penalty for demanding trial by jury, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that a law which had the effect of inducing 
defendants not to contest in "full measure" was patfully 
unconstitutional. The appellant does not claim that the 
Jackson case is relevant to the issues before this court, 
except that it does point up that the law may not be 
designed so that an accused will not avail himself of 
his constitutional guarantees for fear of added punish· 
16 
ment. In this respect it is submitted that the situation 
is analogous where if one wishes to avail himself of his 
constitutional guarantees to an appeal (Article I, Sec-
tion 12, Utah Constitution) he should not be put in 
jeopardy of having additional punishment placed upon 
him when it turns out in that appeal that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to try him in the first instance and 
that upon retrial, upon the same facts and circumstances, 
punishment is meted out to him in excess of that which 
was pronounced in the first instance. 
Where the appellant was sentenced to five days in 
jail upon his first trial, and upon the identical same 
facts at a second trial, his punishment is increased three 
fold, it would appear to the appellant that the court is 
punishing him not for the contempt before the court 
but for having taken an appeal to the Supreme Court 
and having prevailed over the rulings of the District 
Court. 
It is one thing to state that a trial where there was 
no jurisdiction is void and therefore the accused may be 
tried a second time for the same offense, but is some-
thing else to say that the accused, if he seeks to avail 
himself of his constitutional guarantees that he should 
proceed on his own peril that if he should prevail he 
may be punished twice, three or four-fold over that 
which he had been sentenced to in the first trial, if he 
should prevail and be tried a second time. The conse-
quential effect of this rule of law is to effectively pre-
vent an accused from availing himself of his constitu-
17 
I 
tional guarantees for fear of the results of his act. In 
the case at hand it is evident that the assertion of appe}. ! 
lant's constitutional guarantees brought about an inflic· I 
tion of greater and harsher punishment for the attempted . 
protection of those rights. The fact that the punislunent I 
was increased for only ten days is immaterial as one · 
day in jail for one person may be equivalent to one year 
in jail for another, and it is the deprivation of liberty I 
which is the important factor, not the length of that j 
deprivation. 
SUMMARY 
It i~ respectfully submitted to the court that the 
appellant's constitutional rights have been violated in 
this matter, and that this court should enter an order 
reversing the trial court's rulings and further allow 
appellant his constitutional right to his day in court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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